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Abstract 
The aim of the present article is to understand the dynamics underlying the birth, the 
development and the eventual failure of the Duff proposal of 2009-2012, an ambitious attempt to 
change the provisions governing the elections for the European Parliament. In particular, the way 
agenda-setting on electoral reform is shaped in the European Union will be analysed, trying to 
understand if the current stalemate on the issue can be explained in light of factors specific to 
the EU. The report presented by liberal MEP Andrew Duff at the beginning of the seventh 
legislature called on Member States to gather a Convention, in order to introduce fundamental 
improvements in the way Members of the European Parliament are elected. Among the envisaged 
changes, the creation of a pan-European constituency to elect twenty-five Members on 
transnational lists represented the most controversial issue. After having analysed its main 
elements, the path of the Duff report from the committee of Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) to the 
plenary will be analysed. It will be concluded that a sharp contrast exists between the way 
electoral issues are raised in the AFCO committee and the way the Parliament as a whole deals 
with them. Moreover, diverging interests between national delegations inside groups seem to 
play a decisive role in hampering electoral reform. While further research is needed to corroborate 
the present findings, the analysis of the Duff proposal appears to shed light on the different 
barriers that ensure electoral reform is taken off the agenda of the Union, and on the relative 
weight each of them carries. 
 
 
 
The paper is based on the Master’s thesis A Pan-European District for the European Elections? The 
Rise and Fall of the Duff Proposal for the Electoral Reform of the European Parliament, College of 
Europe, Department of European Political and Administrative Studies, 2015. 
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Introduction 
The history of the European Parliament has been marked by the gradual, but constant increase in 
its powers vis-à-vis the other institutions of the European Union. The increasing involvement of 
the Parliament in the EU’s decision-making came also because of its nature as the only 
institution representing European citizens, directly elected since 1979. Today, however, the 
situation is quite different. The expansion of the role of the Parliament in the institutional system 
of the Union coexists with enduring problems in its democratic representativeness. The latter 
derive, among other things, from the peculiar composition of the assembly, the persisting 
separate elections, and the absence of true electoral campaigns. The presentation, at the 
beginning of the seventh legislature (2009-2014), of a report for the reform of the elections for the 
European Parliament by Member of Parliament (MEP) Andrew Duff was aimed at tackling 
precisely these issues. The Parliament had the opportunity, through the approval of this report, to 
put the need for electoral reform again on the agenda of the Union, calling on Member States to 
start the procedure for a Treaty revision. Nonetheless, the Parliament proved to be much more 
reluctant than expected and did not manage to agree on a common position. One issue revealed 
to be much too sensitive: the introduction of a pan-European constituency, which would have 
allowed European voters to cast a second vote to choose among authentically transnational 
party lists.  
Therefore, the aim of this research is to understand the dynamics underlying the rise and 
fall of the Duff proposal of 2009-2012, analysing the process it went through since its birth in the 
Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) committee until its blockage once arrived in the plenary. The 
interest of such a study is twofold. First, it has the potential to contribute further to the 
comprehension of the dynamics of agenda-setting in the European Union, given that both the way 
the report was drafted and then put aside by the Parliament can enrich the existing knowledge on 
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how the agenda of the Union is shaped. Second, electoral reform is not an issue like others: it 
concerns more the nature of representation of citizens than “policy outcomes” narrowly defined. 
It is, therefore, particularly interesting to investigate the peculiarities that characterize agenda-
setting in the field of electoral reform, especially from the perspective of the Parliament. It will be 
concluded that, to a certain extent, the birth and failure of the Duff proposal are representative of 
the structural difficulty for the Parliament to address electoral reform, especially when it comes 
to addressing the way elections are made and the assembly composed. Even if further evidence 
is needed to consolidate the results of the research, it is important to shed light on the different 
hurdles electoral reform must overcome at the level of the EU, and on their relative weight in 
comparison with the national level. In fact, new proposals to increase the democratic legitimacy 
of the EU’s institutional system through the modification of electoral rules are currently being 
examined in the new Parliament.1 Learning from experience in previous legislatures can prove to 
be essential when assessing more recent attempts to modify electoral provisions. 
 
1. Electoral reform in the European Union: a history of success? 
The issue of the electoral reform was perhaps one of the first to be debated in the 
European Parliament, going up and down in the Parliament’s agenda for many years. Today, 
electoral reform is characterised by a series of changes both in the Treaties and in secondary 
legislation that appear, at the same time, to consolidate the equilibrium gradually built over the 
past twenty years and to call for new revisions, in order to give the reformed Treaties full 
implementation. The Lisbon Treaty – drawing on the previous Constitutional Treaty – introduced 
two fundamental modifications that represent a major step forwards in the direction of a quasi-
                                                          
1 With the approval of the Gualtieri-Trzaskowski report of 2013 Parliament committed to submit, by the end of 2015, 
new proposals to the European Council in the view of setting up a new mechanism for the seat reapportionment, to be 
activated before each European election (European Parliament, Resolution of 13 March 2013 on the composition of the 
European Parliament with a view to the 2014 elections, Strasbourg, P7_TA(2013)0082, 13 March 2013). 
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federal parliamentary democracy. The first of them is the qualification of the European 
Parliament as “composed of representatives of the Union's citizens” (article 14.2 TEU), instead of 
“representatives of the peoples of the States brought together in the Community” (article 189 
ECT, as amended by the Nice Treaty). The relevance of the change has to be assessed in the 
broader view of the “parliamentarization” undertaken by the EU institutional system since the 
very beginning of the integration process. The representative function being exercised in relation 
to the individuals as European citizens, and no more as citizens of Member States, the European 
Parliament becomes more similar to the low Chambers of Federal States, laying the foundations 
to develop itself into the centre of the democratic legitimacy of the institutional system. However, 
it still conserves distinctive features of an assembly of its own kind, and in particular the lack of 
common, uniform procedure for the election, or the apportionment of its seats according to the 
degressive proportionality. The latter represents the second great issue of the post-Lisbon era, 
that is to say the seat apportionment of the European Parliament. The new article 14.2 TEU set 
the framework of primary law that every modification in the seat apportionment has to respect, 
while giving the right of initiative to the Parliament. If one considers the reform process in its 
entirety (starting from the first debates in the Parliamentary Assembly of the 1950s and 
culminating in the Lisbon Treaty), it can be argued that the approach of the European Parliament 
was to promote, at each stage, ambitious proposals to implement the provisions of the Treaties, 
trying to influence in a relevant manner the nature of the EU institutional system. It is quite clear 
that, behind the majority of the draft projects concerning the election and composition of the 
assembly, there is a strong federalist approach, even if not always strongly shared by the 
assembly as a whole. All the main reports approved by the Parliament in the electoral domain, in 
fact, reflect the debate taking place in the committee for Constitutional Affairs, which has always 
been significantly biased towards the need to deepen integration and encourage Treaty 
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revisions.2 At the same time, the Parliament found insurmountable problems in coping with 
Member States, which were, ultimately, the key actors in making the issue to advance.  
 
2. The Duff report (2009-2012): the Parliament back on electoral reform after thirteen 
years 
From many respects, the story of the Duff proposal is no different from previous attempts to 
reform the elections for the European Parliament. Significantly, however, this time the Parliament 
was not even able to agree on a proposal to be negotiated with the Member States. The 
measures to improve the elections and the composition of the assembly were, like in the past, put 
forward in the perspective of a new progress in the “federalization” of Europe. Again, its 
proposers and main supporters can be clearly characterized as convinced federalists, whose 
main goal was bridging the gap between the broadening of the Parliament’s powers and its 
democratic accountability. In addition, it has to be noted that the debate on many of the essential 
elements of the Duff proposal dates back to years ago, especially for what concerns the pan-
European constituency.3 The purpose of the present section is to briefly analyse the Duff 
proposal, highlighting its main distinctive features while taking into account the several 
modifications it underwent during the debate in the Parliament. 
                                                          
2 Since its establishment in 1982, following the Crocodile initiative launched by Altiero Spinelli, the committee 
constituted the framework in which leading figures of the Parliament dealt with institutional matters, like the creation 
of common electoral rules. The committee (named committee for Institutional Affairs until 1999) has always taken an 
ambitious approach regarding European integration, promoting own-initiative Treaty revisions when considered 
necessary (for the 1984 Draft Treaty inspired by Spinelli, see R. Corbett, The European Parliament’s role in closer EU 
integration, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Macmillan press, 1998, pp. 142-160). 
3 In fact, it was already included in the proposal of the European Movement for the 1999 elections, which proposed an 
additional quota of 5% of MEPs elected on a transnational basis (Duff, Electoral Reform of the European Parliament, op. 
cit., p. 17). 
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To begin with, the proposal made by liberal MEP Andrew Duff, first published in the form 
of a working document of May 2010 in the AFCO committee4 and later tabled as a draft report the 
following November,5 underwent several revisions, but maintained its fundamental characters 
through all the procedure in the Parliament. The AFCO committee adopted the report two times: 
the first, in April 2011;6 the second, after the referral back of the plenary, in February 2012.7 The 
core element was the introduction of a pan-European constituency to elect twenty-five Members 
of Parliament, based on transnational lists set up by European parties. In all the different 
versions, the envisaged introduction of a single “federal” district across the Union remained the 
central part of the proposal, but also its main controversial point. For the first time since the 
introduction of direct elections, European citizens would have a second vote to cast, allowing 
them to vote directly for a European list with “federal” candidates beyond the current national 
electoral campaign. The specific modalities to put in place the constituency, though, were 
changed many times. For example, the rapporteur modified both the formula adopted for the 
transposition of the votes in seats (from the more proportional Sainte-Laguë to the D’Hondt 
method) and the way candidates are elected inside the transnational list (from semi-open8 to 
closed lists). In contrast, the requirement for the lists to be composed by candidates coming from 
at least one third of Member States was maintained, along with the reference to gender and 
minority representation (but without any compulsory requirements). Furthermore, the report 
                                                          
4 European Parliament, Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Working document on a proposal for a modification of the Act 
concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage of 20 September 1976, 19 
May 2010. 
5 European Parliament, Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Draft Report on a proposal for a modification of the Act 
concerning the election of the members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage of 20 September 1976, 5 
November 2010. 
6 European Parliament, Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Report on a proposal for a modification of the Act concerning 
the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage of 20 September 1976, A7-0176/2011, 
28 April 2011, p. 32. 
7 European Parliament, Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Second Report on a proposal for a modification of the Act 
concerning the election of the Members of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage of 20 September 1976, A7-
0027/2012, 1 February 2012. 
8 With semi-preferential lists, the voter can vote express its preference for an individual candidate, changing the order 
of the party-list. 
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foresaw the establishment of an electoral authority at the EU level to validate the results for the 
pan-European district. Overall, the declared purpose of the rapporteur was that of enhancing the 
European dimension of the elections for the Parliament, in order to make the decisions taken at 
the EU level more legitimate. In that way, the pan-European constituency would be consistent 
with the implementation of article 14.2 TEU as reformed by the Lisbon Treaty, while offering a 
unique opportunity for the European parties to exercise the typical party functions of selecting 
candidatures and managing an electoral campaign. Thus, the report aimed at allowing the 
European electorate to express its preferences on the policy actions to be taken by the EU, and at 
encouraging the European parties to frame properly a European debate. 
 
Table 1 – THE PAN-EUROPEAN CONSTITUENCY IN THE DUFF PROPOSAL 
 1st Working 
document 
1st Draft report 1st Report 2nd report 
25 MEPs elected 
in transnational 
lists 
Additional to the 
751 MEPs 
Additional to the 
751 MEPs 
Additional to the 
751 MEPs 
Drawn from the 
751 MEPs 
Electoral formula Sainte-Laguë Sainte-Laguë Sainte-Laguë D’Hondt 
Type of list Semi-preferential Semi-preferential Closed Closed 
Eligibility criteria 
for transnational 
lists 
Lists composed 
by candidates 
coming from at 
least 1/3 of MS 
Lists composed 
by candidates 
coming from at 
least 1/3 of MS 
Lists composed 
by candidates 
coming from at 
least 1/3 of MS 
Lists composed 
by candidates 
coming from at 
least 1/3 of MS 
Gender and 
minority 
representation 
To be promoted 
(not compulsory) 
To be promoted 
(not compulsory) 
To be promoted 
(not compulsory) 
To be promoted 
(not compulsory) 
Central EU 
electoral 
authority 
To be set up in 
order to check 
elections in pan-
EU constituency 
To be set up in 
order to check 
elections in pan-
EU constituency 
To be set up in 
order to check 
elections in pan-
EU constituency 
To be set up in 
order to check 
elections in pan-
EU constituency 
 
The second distinctive element of the proposal concerns the establishment of a 
mathematical formula for the reapportionment of the Parliament’s seats among Member States, 
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in application of article 14.2, second subparagraph TEU. Here, the purpose of the rapporteur was 
twofold: first, fulfilling the duty of producing a new allocation of seats in the perspective of 
expiring derogations9 and upcoming enlargements; second, taking the reapportionment of seats 
away from inter-state negotiations. Instead, the ultimate aim was to come up with a formula for a 
review of the allocation of seats on a regular basis, in order to take account not only for new 
accessions, but also for demographic changes. 
Table 2 – A NEW MECHANISM FOR SEAT ALLOCATION 
 1st Working 
document 
1st Draft report 1st Report 2nd report 
 
Seat 
reapportionment 
 
Need for a 
durable and 
transparent 
mathematical 
formula 
mentioned in the 
explanatory 
statement 
 
Amendment to 
article 14.2 TEU, 
distribution of 
seats among 
Member States 
reviewed 
regularly “in 
accordance with 
a formula based 
on the total 
resident 
population of the 
States”, no later 
than 12 months 
before the end of 
the mandate 
(new par. 2a) 
 
Proposal to 
“enter into a 
dialogue with the 
European 
Council to 
explore the 
possibility of 
reaching 
agreement on a 
durable and 
transparent 
mathematical 
formula for the 
apportionment 
of seats”. 
Amendment to 
article 14.2 TEU 
with no mention 
to the 
mathematical 
formula, but only 
to the regular 
review of the 
allocation of 
seats 
 
Proposal to 
“entre into a 
dialogue with the 
European 
Council to 
explore the 
possibility of 
reaching 
agreement on a 
durable and 
transparent 
apportionment 
of seats in 
Parliament”. No 
amendment to 
article 14.2 TEU 
                                                          
9 The Lisbon provisions found full application only from 2014. 
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Other parts of the proposal concerned issues that only apparently were minor. Some of 
these issues, like the reform of the existing Council directive 93/109/EC on the right to vote and 
stand for European elections in other Member States, were already in the Parliament’s agenda.10 
Others, like the establishment of a common age of voting, were added to it in a “federalist” 
perspective, to be included in a wide-encompassing reform of the Treaties, sometimes drawing 
on older proposals.11 Concerning the period for holding the elections, the different versions of the 
Duff report foresaw the shifting of the elections from June to May, in order to increase 
participation and anticipate the investiture of the new Commission. In addition, the first versions 
of the proposal envisaged concentrating the polling days into a single weekend, in order to avoid 
information leaking about electoral results from Member States voting before. Concerning the 
proposal to modify Protocol n. 7 on Privileges and Immunities, the purpose of the rapporteur was 
to put in place a common and updated supranational regime for the privileges and immunities of 
MEPs, in order to make the Parliament fully sovereign in verifying the credentials of its members 
and in allowing for replacement of vacant seats. To conclude, the first version of the Duff report 
included also the possibility of strengthening electronic voting, in order to make easier the vote in 
European elections. 
 
                                                          
10 With reference to the right to vote and stand at European elections (indeed regulated by article 22.2 TFEU following a 
special legislative procedure, in which the Parliament is only consulted), it was aimed at broadening the scope of the 
proposal then advanced by the Barroso Commission. Going beyond the Commission’s initiative, the Duff proposal 
committed the Parliament to urge not only for some improvements of the current procedures to register in other 
Member States, but also for the abolition of the prohibition of multiple candidatures across Europe. The possibility of a 
Member State not to recognize the exclusion from the right to vote or stand for a citizen in another Member State was 
also envisaged. All of these elements were maintained until the end in the report. 
11 Concerning the establishment of regional constituencies, for example, the rapporteur drew on the Anastassopoulos 
report of 1998 in proposing that constituencies at regional level must be set up in most populous Member States. Here, 
the idea was to avoid creating an excessive distance between voters and candidates, through the combination of 
territorial constituencies and semi-open preferential lists. This combination, however, does not figure in later versions 
of the report. Similarly, later versions of the proposal abandoned the initial purpose to create a uniform minimum age 
for voting and standing as candidate, particularly introducing a minimum age for voting at European elections at 16. 
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Table 3 – OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE DUFF PROPOSAL 
 1st Working 
document 
1st Draft report 1st Report 2nd report 
Regional 
constituencies 
To be introduced 
in more 
populous MS 
National law National law National law 
Age of voting 16 years 
established at 
EU level 
National law National law National law 
Right to vote and 
stand in EP 
elections 
Make easier to 
exercise the right 
to vote and 
stand in other 
MS 
Make easier to 
exercise the right 
to vote and 
stand in other 
MS 
Make easier to 
exercise the right 
to vote and 
stand in other 
MS 
Make easier to 
exercise the right 
to vote and 
stand in other 
MS 
Election period From June to 
May, during the 
same weekend 
From June to 
May 
From June to 
May 
From June to 
May 
Modification of 
Protocol 7 
Establish a 
common regime 
for privileges and 
immunities of 
MEPs 
Establish a 
common regime 
for privileges and 
immunities of 
MEPs 
Establish a 
common regime 
for privileges and 
immunities of 
MEPs 
Establish a 
common regime 
for privileges and 
immunities of 
MEPs 
Electronic vote Promote e-voting No mention No mention No mention 
 
To sum up, the Duff proposal of 2009-2012 can be sub-divided in several proposals, each 
covering a specific field of the elections for the European Parliament, but all consistent in the way 
they aim at making elections more supranational and less dependent on merely national 
provisions. Moreover, even if the proposal underwent many modifications in its path back and 
forth from the AFCO committee and the plenary, its more distinctive elements – in particular, the 
establishment of a pan-European constituency to elect twenty-five new MEPs – were left 
unchanged. It comes from the previous considerations that the Duff proposal, first put forward in 
2009, was conceived by its author as a major step in the development of parliamentary 
democracy at EU level, an essential instrument to accelerate the process of “parliamentarization” 
undertaken by the institutional system of the Union through the different Treaty changes. 
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Notwithstanding the expectations of the rapporteur and of the main supporters in the Parliament, 
however, all the different versions of the report were not able to overcome the resistance to 
electoral change. As anticipated, the exam in the plenary of the first version of the proposal was 
first postponed, and then referred back to the committee. A second report was later approved by 
the AFCO committee, but never put on the agenda of the plenary by the Conference of Presidents. 
Could we have expected this failure? 
 
3. Which theoretical framework to analyse electoral reform? 
The choice of the proper theoretical framework is crucial for any analysis concerning electoral 
reform, and all the more so for an analysis that focuses on the production of electoral reform at 
the EU level. In the broader picture of the EU’s policy-cycle, the early stage of agenda-setting is 
the most relevant for the purpose of this analysis. As mentioned before, the Duff proposal was 
put on the agenda of the AFCO committee in 2010, but it struggled to be put on the agenda of the 
plenary, being postponed and then referred back to the committee. The issue of a wide-
encompassing electoral reform was eventually removed from the Parliament’s agenda before the 
end of the 2009-2014 term, mirroring the incapability of MEPs to reach an agreement in order to 
start negotiations with Member States.  
Accordingly, it is at this stage that one has to investigate the feasibility of the proposal, 
how it was perceived, and if its fate was inevitable. In this respect, the existence of several 
models for the study of the agenda-setting, and specifically of the agenda-setting in the EU, offers 
a variety of instruments to carry out this research. European studies deals extensively with the 
policy cycle of the institutions of the European Union, that is to say with the different stages 
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leading to the adoption and implementation of a policy in a certain area.12 More specifically, there 
is a general agreement on the definition of the agenda-setting as the stage in the policy cycle in 
which, broadly speaking, specific policy issue come to be considered by policy-makers. To quote 
Princen, “agenda-setting is not concerned with the actual decisions that are taken, but with the 
issues that decision-makers devote attention to: the issues they talk about, think about, write 
about and take into consideration”.13 
In pursuance of an explanation of the ultimate failure of the Duff proposal to achieve its 
goal of setting the agenda of the EU decision-makers, Princen’s model represents a good starting 
point14. The model is based on the definition of the agenda on three steps, each highlighting a 
different stage in the process aimed at shaping the agenda of the EU institutions: 
1. The development of a transnational policy network, whose precise goal is the setup of a 
transnational European policy debate in order to exert influence over policy-makers;15 
2. The transition from the policy network’s agenda to the agenda of the EU decision-makers. 
According to Princen, it is possible to pinpoint three different pathways the issues can follow in 
                                                          
12 For a definition of policy cycle: L. Buonanno & N. Nugent, Policies and Policy Processes of the European Union, 
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 101. 
13 S. Princen, Agenda-setting in the European Union, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 1. However, applying 
these analytical frameworks to the issue of the electoral reform poses a number of problems. In fact, the definition of 
“what is” electoral reform is an issue of primordial importance for the present study, given that, as explained in the 
previous section, the Duff proposal was a patchwork of several proposals combined together. Usually, the literature in 
the electoral field has focused on the reforms that change the key elements of a system, affecting its proportionality 
directly (the electoral formula) or indirectly (district magnitude, legal threshold, assembly size: see A. Lijphart, Electoral 
Systems and Party Systems, A Study of Twenty-Seven Democracies 1945-1990, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 
79). Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that this narrow definition fails in taking into account changes that are only 
apparently minor (for example, in the right to vote or in voter registration), but actually affect the behaviour of parties 
and candidates. The construction of a definition able to take into consideration these aspects clearly goes beyond the 
aim of this essay, but the conceptualisation recently proposed by Jacobs and Leyenaar (K. Jacobs & M. Leyenaar, “A 
Conceptual Framework for Major, Minor, and Technical Electoral Reform”, West European Politics, vol. 34, n. 3, pp. 495-
513, May 2011) can serve as a theoretical benchmark to analyse the Duff proposal. So, even though the importance of 
the pan-European constituency is obviously at the heart of this study, references will be made to other aspects of the 
proposal. 
14 Princen, op. cit., pp. 151-156. 
15 According to Princen, the creation of such a transnational network requires the existence of a number of conditions, 
and in particular: a convergence among the perspectives of policy experts across Member States; their connection 
through a transnational network. In this way, a policy issue comes into consideration at a wider European level, even if 
it is not yet on the agenda of policy-makers (ibid., pp. 151-152). 
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shifting from transnational debate to the EU’s agenda: when a domestic actor takes the issue to 
the Union level; when an EU actor takes up an issue; or when an international organization brings 
an issue to the attention of the EU institutions; 
3. Finally, the success of or failure to overcome the filters that normally block the entrance of an 
issue in the EU’s agenda for actual decision-making. 
Concerning the first stage, it will be hypothesised that, in the case of the electoral reform, 
a more top-down dynamic was put in place, not unlike previous cases of electoral reform at the 
EU level. As in previous attempts to electoral reform, one can expect the main promoters of the 
issue to have been essentially members of the European Parliament, group administrators and, to 
a lesser extent, academics, all gravitating around the AFCO committee. This stems from the fact 
that, unlike in other policy areas, the electoral issue implies mainly the right of initiative of the 
Parliament. In addition, it will be analysed to what extent the need to implement existing Treaty 
provisions played a role. From this point of view, it is important to bear in mind that, as observed 
by Buonanno and Nugent,16 the most part of the issues on the agenda of the EU decision-makers 
derives from the implementation or the update of existing policies.17 Accordingly, one can expect 
that electoral reform does not represent an exception. Indeed, the issue of electoral reform was, 
in a certain way, already in the broad agenda of the EU institutions after the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty (new provisions included in the Treaties). Hence, it is matter of verifying empirically 
which was the role played by them. 
                                                          
16 Buonanno & Nugent, op. cit., p. 103. 
17 The predominance of ongoing issues in the EU’s agenda is a result of several factors. According to Nugent, ibid., 
policy intervention at EU level tends to be partial and prudent, so further improvement/streamlining is often needed (all 
the more so in the electoral field, given the partial and difficult implementation of the relevant Treaty provisions). In 
addition, implementation and ex post assessment of policy interventions lead generally to the review of existing 
provisions. 
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With regards to the second and third stage, Princen adopts Kingdon’s model18 
distinguishing between “governmental agenda” and “decision agenda”. The difference lays, 
essentially, in the existence of concrete decisions to take: in the first case, the adoption of acts 
like common programmes, papers (for the Commission) or own-initiative reports (for the 
Parliament) is not decisive for the formal start of the decision-making process. It is not 
surprising, consequently, that the main literature on the agenda-setting has underlined the 
different dynamics that characterise the two types of agendas. In the first case, in fact, it appears 
easier to influence the broader governmental agenda. One can only consider the fact that, 
sometimes, the same actors who participate in the European debate on the issue are important 
actors of the decision-making process, like the members of the European Parliament for the 
debate on the pan-European constituency. It is also possible that, at this stage, those who try to 
influence the agenda of the Union are not still unanimous in the form of the policy intervention 
envisaged, being united only in calling for the Union to act in a certain field. Again, the argument 
put forward by Buonanno and Nugent on the automaticity of the agenda-setting in the EU must 
be taken into account. In the case of the decision agenda, on the other hand, it is much more 
difficult to succeed in setting the priorities of the decision-makers. The supporters of a policy 
initiative must overcome several hurdles, if they want to modify in a substantial way the agenda 
of the EU. These hurdles can be of various type, but, in the case of electoral reform, they assume 
a peculiar form. 
In his work, Princen limits his theoretical toolkit for the third stage of agenda-setting to 
two, general categories of “hurdles” that an issue has to face to move from the governmental to 
the decision agenda.19 Nevertheless, in order to take fully into account the nature of electoral 
                                                          
18 J. W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies, updated 2nd ed., New York, Longman, 2011. 
19 Princen, op. cit., p. 154 (where he distinguishes between opposition from other EU institutions – “horizontal 
blockage” - and from Member States – “vertical blockage”). 
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reform, a more specific approach is needed. Electoral reform, in fact, must face exceptional 
hurdles to access the decision agenda. These are, in some way, typical of the electoral field. In 
order to cope with these aspects, it is necessary to supplement Princen’s model, in order to 
enlarge our comprehension of the third stage of the agenda-setting with regards to the dynamics 
of electoral reform. According to Rahat and Hazan;20 the aim of a proper approach to electoral 
reform is to identify a “menu of barriers that those who aspire to reform the electoral system will 
need to overcome in order to achieve their goal”.21 Consequently, they list “seven possible hurdles 
that reformers face when trying to promote electoral system reform”22 at the national level. The 
assumption is simple: while it is quite easy to make electoral reform part of the governmental 
agenda, it is more difficult to understand why it does not succeed in going further. Far from being 
smooth, the pathway towards the inclusion of an electoral reform into the decision agenda is 
marked by hurdles that tend to ensure the perpetuation of the status quo. They can be listed as 
follows, according to the relative focus: 
 Procedural superiority of the status quo (legal) 
 Political tradition (cultural focus) 
 Social structure (sociological focus) 
 System level rationale (systemic focus) 
 Vested interests (seat maximizing rationale) 
 Coalition politics (veto players) 
 Disagreement over content (game theory) 23 
                                                          
20 G. Rahat & R. Hazan, “The Barriers to Electoral System Reform: A Synthesis of Alternative Approaches”, West 
European Politics, vol. 34, n. 3, May 2011, pp. 478-494. 
21 Ibid., p. 478. 
22 Ibid., p. 479. 
23 Ibid. 
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Starting from the first barrier, the procedural superiority of the status quo, Rahat and Hazan 
observe how easier it is for the opponents of an electoral reform to block it at an earlier stage. 
From an institutionalist perspective, the two authors focus on the rules governing change in 
electoral provisions. They argue that a change in the status quo is difficult in itself, because of 
the need to modify the present legislation. In addition, they underline the fact that, being the 
electoral field a sensitive domain, it is often required more than a simple majority in the 
legislative assembly to pass a reform. This is particularly true in the case of the European Union, 
where the electoral domain is still mainly covered by primary law (in the form of the electoral Act 
of 1976). 
Concerning the cultural factor, Rahat and Hazan include the political tradition of a certain 
country as a relevant barrier to overcome in order to succeed in electoral reform. They build on 
the broader argument of Lijphart, affirming that “the institutional setting – especially that of 
stable, established democracies – is linked to a country’s culture and to its political tradition. It is 
culture and political tradition that explain the tendency of the Anglo-American democracies 
toward majoritarianism, and the tendency of Continental democracies toward consensualism – 
including their proportional electoral systems”.24 In addition, every political tradition tends to 
mirror a specific structure of the society, reflecting the basic arrangements that govern the “rules 
of the game”. Consequently, a structural link exists between the political tradition and the social 
structure of a country, the third kind of barriers listed by Rahat and Hazan. Again, the two authors 
borrow from Lijphart the observation of a correlation between the degree of heterogeneity of a 
society and the electoral system adopted, with proportional representation being a privileged 
instrument for consensus-building and power-sharing. It comes from this approach that electoral 
reform can be conceptualized as “an attempt either to adapt to societal changes […] or to counter 
                                                          
24 Ibid., p. 481. 
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their influence”.25 Apparently, it is more difficult to apply this type of barrier to the European 
Union, given the difficulty to establish a link between the rise of the electoral issue in the EU’s 
agenda and modifications in the societal structure of the Member States. Nevertheless, the EU as 
a whole has been conceived as a consociational system.26 From this point of view, the current 
arrangements on the Parliament’s elections can be interpreted as a guarantee to conserve 
national peculiarities.27 Following this logic, we can expect electoral reform to be much more 
difficult to put on the EU’s agenda if it implies renegotiating the representation of “territorial” 
minorities. 
The fourth hurdle included in the barriers approach deals with the system-level rationale, or 
the degree of functioning of the existing system. Following Rahat and Hazan, “a country will 
preserve its electoral system as long as the system produces certain “expected” outputs”.28 As 
reported by Rahat and Hazan, Shugart defined the latter as the distortions arising from the 
application of an electoral system: distortions that can, like in the British case, lead to the 
proposal of reforms to correct its failure.29 This argument is particularly appropriate for the 
European Parliament between 1979 and 2002, when the election of the British Members through 
a plurality system led systematically to a disproportionate weight of the British delegation in the 
main groups. Today, however, distortions derive mainly from the maintenance of separate 
national elections, with different ratios between seats and votes persisting in each Member 
State. Hence, in the 2014 elections, the parties affiliated to the S&D group won the majority of the 
                                                          
25 Ibid., p. 482. 
26 Applying categories originally used for the study of divided societies at national level, several scholars have 
interpreted the EU as a political system characterised by the existence of multiple lines of division (sometimes, but not 
always, following the geographical borders), the over-representation of minorities (in this case, smaller Member States) 
and, finally, the existence of an integrated élite taking common decisions by compromise and consensus (generally the 
common lowest denominator): N. Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 7th ed., Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 425-426. 
27 D. Schleicher, “What if Europe Held an Election and No One Cared?”, Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 52, n. 1, 
winter 2011, p. 148. 
28 Rahat & Hazan, op. cit., p. 482. 
29 M. S. Shugart, “Inherent and Contingent Factors in Reform Initiation in Plurality Systems”, in A. Blais (ed.), To Keep or 
To Change First Past the Post?, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 7-60, cited in Rahat & Hazan, ibid., p. 483. 
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EU citizens’ vote (40 million, compared to the 39.9 of the EPP), but the EPP group won more seats 
in the Parliament, gaining more votes in the biggest Member States and thus obtaining the 
Presidency of the Commission. Consequently, what is now deemed problematic in the 
functioning of the system is its inability to translate the will of the European citizens in a 
transparent electoral dynamic, leading to a federal-level mandate for the Members of Parliament 
to act on European issues. It remains to be seen if this “expected output” is shared by MEPs. 
Finally, the last three criteria of the barriers approach are the vested interest of incumbent 
decision-makers, the blockage deriving from coalition politics and, in general, disagreement over 
the content of the proposal. In analysing these hurdles, the two authors take as a term of 
reference national politics, thus making use of concepts like that of “majority coalition” whose 
application to the EU is still controversial. Nevertheless, they introduce some considerations that 
are valid at the Union level as well. In particular, when dealing with electoral reform, the following 
elements come into play: 
 Does the envisaged reform increase the seats potentially gained by a political party or, in 
the European case, a national delegation? 
 To what extent is it possible to foresee the outcome, in terms of winners and losers of the 
proposed reform? Which is the complexity of the reform? 
 Are there different proposals or lines of action among the supporters of the reform? What 
is the trade-off between the preferred option and the zero option (that is to say, no 
reform)? 
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To a varying extent, all the mentioned criteria30 can be fruitfully combined together, and employed 
to analyse the pathway of the Duff proposal of 2009-2012 through the debate in the Parliament. It 
will be analysed, accordingly, if the self-interest of the incumbent Members of Parliament played 
a major or minor role in the failure of the attempt to set the EU’s agenda, considering that, in all 
political systems, vested interests of legislators oppose an almost insuperable obstacle to the 
improvement of the existing electoral rules. For the purpose of the present analysis, the barriers 
to electoral reform in the EU can be classified, through an adaptation of the barriers model, as 
follows: 
Table 4 - BARRIERS TO ELECTORAL SYSTEM REFORM IN THE EU 
Focus Barrier 
Legal (several different procedures and/or Treaty 
revision, complicated and long process) 
Procedural superiority of the status quo 
Cultural-sociological (the European Union as a 
consociational system over-representing 
minorities) 
Political tradition and social structure 
Systemic (expected output, distortions or 
inconsistencies) 
System-level rationale 
Seat maximizing in political and national 
representation; complexity of the reform and 
(presumed) unpredictability of its outcome; 
veto players between and inside political 
groups. 
Vested interests, coalition politics and 
disagreement over content 
Source: elaborated on the basis of Rahat & Hazan (2011)31 
In the present article, the role of the mentioned barriers in the case of the Duff proposal will be 
examined. More specifically, the following hypotheses are made: 
 On the one hand, the complex procedures to carry out revisions of the existing rules for 
the elections of the European Parliament constitute a deterrent in itself towards putting 
                                                          
30 We can, though, expect a minor role for coalition politics, given that it is unlikely that a proposal for reform has a 
strong impact on the relationship between the main political groups supporting the election of the incumbent 
Commission 
31 Ibid., p. 479. 
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the issue high in the EU’s agenda, especially after the long and contrasted ratification 
process of the Lisbon Treaty, and all the more so after the outbreak of the Euro-crisis; 
 Though the Parliament traditionally embraced its role as representative assembly of 
European citizens, and notwithstanding the fact that its internal functioning is based on 
transnational political groups, one could still expect those MEPs who benefit from the 
current arrangement for the composition and elections of the Parliament to be reluctant 
to discuss ambitious reforms. Consequently, it can be expected that any electoral reform 
aimed at making the Parliament more similar to a federal assembly in its election and 
composition will be opposed by MEPs coming from the Member States penalised by the 
proposed reform, given that the status quo is perceived as  representing every component 
of the EU’s society and territories; 
  MEPs should not be particularly open when debating current distortions of the translation 
of votes in seats, if the correction of these distortions goes against the need to maintain 
the status quo; 
 Finally, it can be expected that, as in every electoral reform, there is a natural resistance 
toward changing electoral rules, given that incumbent Members of Parliament are elected 
on that basis. Moreover, different interests (especially if wrongly perceived) can lead to 
opposition to the proposal, even if expressed on different parts of it. 
Consequently, if these hypotheses are confirmed, the failure of the Duff proposal can be 
interpreted as a case of non agenda-setting, which is much more likely to take place in the “policy 
area” of electoral reforms than in other fields. This does not in any way detract from the 
importance of the analysis. On the contrary, it contributes to the study of the factors that shape 
the agenda-setting in the EU, because it highlights the dynamics that lead to the exclusion of an 
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issue from the agenda32. In the peculiar case of the Duff proposal of 2009-2012, it has to be 
understood if the activation of the above-mentioned barriers, and according to which relative 
importance, made it impossible for the proposal to enter in the interinstitutional agenda of the EU, 
going beyond the sphere of the internal debate in the Parliament. 
 
4. The Duff proposal on the AFCO agenda 
With the benefit of hindsight, one could be surprised at observing the contrast between the 
eventual fate of the Duff proposal and the dedication of the AFCO committee in treating the issue 
since the very beginning of the seventh Parliamentary term. Before analysing the scrutiny 
process it went through, it is essential to understand how the Duff proposal succeeded in being 
included in the agenda of the Parliament, in the framework of the AFCO committee. 
In the previous paragraphs it has been hypothesised that, in the case of electoral reform, 
the role of the existing provisions of the Treaties can be decisive in setting the governmental 
agenda, while the formation of a transnational policy debate across Member States tends to play 
a minor role. Overall, it appears quite evident that the Duff report does not distance itself from the 
majority of the several proposals that have been discussed in the history of the European 
integration. In particular, both the direct reporting of relevant actors and the analysis of official 
documents seem to confirm that two “general trends” can be outlined about how electoral 
reforms come to the attention of the Parliament. First, as mentioned before, the Treaties tend to 
offer the MEPs, and particularly the most federalist-minded of them, the opportunity to promote a 
debate on the way to implement them in an integrationist perspective. In so doing, MEPs exploit 
                                                          
32 G. R. King, O. Keohane & S. Verba, Designing Social Inquiry, Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, Princeton, 
Princeton University press, 1994, p. 129, cited in Princen, op. cit., p. 53. The importance of non agenda-setting has been 
acknowledged since the seminal work of P. Bachrach and M. S. Baratz, “Two faces of power”, American Political Science 
Review, vol. 56, n. 4, 1962, pp. 947-952, in which the two authors focus on the power to hold issues off the agenda (so-
called “non decision-making”, as opposed to “official” decision-making power). 
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fully the letter of the Treaties, making use of previously approved Treaty changes that, at the time 
of their adoption, were often underestimated by national governments. After Lisbon, this was the 
case of the inclusion of the above-mentioned article 14.2, first subparagraph TEU, stating that the 
Parliament represents the citizens of the Union and not merely the peoples of Member States; or 
of the right of initiative of the Parliament in the domain of seat distribution, following article 14.2, 
second subparagraph TEU. In general, one could say that, apart from the introduction of the pan-
European constituency, most of the elements included in the Duff proposal were already on the 
Parliament’s agenda.33  
The second “trend” that appears to characterize the emergence of the issue of electoral 
reform in the Parliament’s agenda concerns the actors who promoted it. In fact, while the need to 
implement the Treaties played an important role in allowing the rapporteur to put the issue on the 
Parliament’s agenda, much less relevant was the formation of transnational networks to support 
the proposal. This does not means that experts and academics were not active in examining the 
perspective of a new electoral reform for the European Parliament, before and in parallel to the 
struggle to place the matter at the top of the parliamentary agenda. In fact, beyond the “ordinary” 
research activity of European think tanks on the need for “authentically European” elections, ad 
hoc groups of scholars and specialists assisted the rapporteur in the preparation of the proposal, 
                                                          
33 The need to reopen the seat apportionment between Member States was inevitable because of the expiration of the 
existing derogations to article 14.2 TEU; and in perspective of the following enlargement, particularly that of Croatia 
and Iceland (then deemed to enter the Union in few years). With reference to the issue of the right to vote and stand at 
the European elections, it was already in the Union’s agenda since the Barroso I Commission had approved a proposal 
to revise directive 93/109/EC. Again, the rapporteur built on the existing proposal to broaden it and make it more 
radical, including more federalist elements like the possibility of multiple candidatures in different Member States. 
Even the modification of Protocol n. 7 on Privileges and Immunities, which would require a revision of primary law, was 
already put on the Parliament’s agenda at the time of the approval of the 2005 Statute of the Members of Parliament 
(pursuant to article 223.2 TFEU). Ultimately, every true Parliament is sovereign in the control of the credentials of its 
members. 
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particularly with regard to the “mathematical formula” for seat reapportionment.34 In addition, 
organizations traditionally supporting the federalist cause – like the European Movement - were 
active as well in promoting the reform, especially in Brussels.35 However, it is hardly deniable that 
these kind of networks can have difficulty fitting  the transnational model of supporting 
organizations theorized by scholars in the field of agenda setting. The existing literature 
examines the first steps in the setting of the agenda by drawing on case studies that are very 
different in nature from electoral reform, such as environmental policy or agriculture policy. The 
emergence of an issue at European level and its entry into the generic governmental agenda 
(through a debate inside one or more of the institutions of the EU) is dealt with through an 
analysis on how interest groups manage cross-border cooperation, shift an issue at European 
level and use public mobilization to exercise pressure on EU policy-makers. In the case of 
electoral reform, however, the relevance of this dynamic appears to be much more limited for two 
main reasons. First, the complexity of the issue makes it difficult for the supporters to go beyond 
the typically Brussels environment, privileging other strategies inside the institutional venues. 
Second, electoral reform constitutes a perfect example of how, even in presence of weak 
pressure “from the outside” on decision-makers, an issue can easily reach the governmental 
agenda (where the perspective of active decision-making is still far from the actual discussion) 
“from the inside”. If we analyse the dynamics that led to the birth of the Duff proposal of 2009-
2012, we can notice the activism of the same policy-makers who were entitled to decide on the 
issue, who were at the forefront in picking up the issue and promoting a debate on it. This is 
consistent with previous analyses on the policy dynamics taking place in the AFCO committee, 
                                                          
34 It is the case of the group of scholars who elaborated the so-called Cambridge compromise on the calculation of a 
mathematical formula for seat reapportionment: European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy 
Department C, Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, The allocation between the EU Member States of the seats in the 
European Parliament. Cambridge Compromise, Note for the AFCO committee, Brussels, March 2011, retrieved 27 March 
2011 at http://www.statslab.cam.ac.uk/~grg/papers/cam-report-final2.pdf, p. 4. 
35 Interview with Sietse Wijnsma, Policy advisor in the AFCO committee (ALDE group), Brussels, 24 March 2015. 
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emphasizing the relatively narrow circles that lead to the drafting of reports,36 and the quite 
consensual nature of its working, marked by the existence of an “authority group” which 
manages the committee’s agenda.37 In our case, liberal MEP Andrew Duff38 was, at the same 
time, the main promoter and the rapporteur on the proposal. With the help of other leading figures 
in the political groups, he revamped the federalist intergroup in the European Parliament to play a 
new role in the coming legislature. In this regard, the birth of the Spinelli group in 201039 appears 
to have been more decisive for later stages in the debate on European elections (like the 
introduction of the Spitzenkandidaten system or the project for a Treaty reform to strengthen the 
Economic and Monetary Union) than in the debate over the pan-European constituency.40 
Nonetheless, the core of the group was already active in putting the electoral reform on the 
agenda of the Parliament between 2009 and 2010. We can find these kind of figures among the 
shadow rapporteurs and group coordinators who successfully managed to start the procedure in 
the AFCO committee. Among them, it is worth mentioning clearly federalist MEPs like Guy 
Verhofstadt (leader of the ALDE group, then in the AFCO committee), Iñigo Méndez de Vigo 
(shadow rapporteur for the EPP before being appointed in the Spanish government), Rafał 
Trzaskowski (succeeding EPP shadow rapporteur), Roberto Gualtieri (S&D shadow rapporteur), 
Enrique Guerrero Salom (S&D coordinator in the AFCO committee), Gerald Häfner (shadow 
rapporteur for the Greens). Other leading MEPs like Elmar Brok41 (EPP) or Jo Leinen42 (S&D) were 
also at the forefront. If we focus on the profile of these MEPs, they are all consistent with the 
average profile of the “authority group” normally leading the works of the committee, that is to 
                                                          
36 W. Beauvallet et al., “La production de la légitimité institutionnelle au Parlement européen : le cas de la commission 
des affaires constitutionnelles”, Politique européenne, vol. 2, n. 28, 2009, pp. 95-100. 
37 Ibid., pp. 90-94. 
38 Then President of the Union of European Federalists. 
39 The initiative was launched in September 2010 and aimed at creating a network based in the Parliament but open to 
civil society, in order to influence the EU’s decision-making in a federalist sense. 
40 Interview with Sietse Wijnsma, Policy advisor in the AFCO committee (ALDE group), Brussels, 24 March 2015. 
41 Then substitute member in the committee. 
42 Chair of the AFCO committee in 2004-2009 and President of the European Movement since 2011. 
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say, political entrepreneurs who are strongly Europeanised, with specialised expertise and 
previous political experience in national or European politics.43. This makes the “policy area” of 
electoral reform even more suitable than other policy areas for showing the existence of a “top-
down” dynamics in agenda-setting of the EU. 
In the previous paragraphs, the three pathways theorised by Princen for the governmental 
agenda-setting have been recalled: the first going from the domestic sphere (national 
governments, interest groups or civil society actors) to the EU level; the second taking place 
directly at the EU level, with one or more institutions picking up an issue in presence of a 
favourable context to promote them; the third going from international organizations to the EU 
level. From what has been reported above, it is clear that electoral reform constitutes a perfect 
case study for the analysis of the second pathway. In addition, it was the Parliament,  not the 
Commission, that was the main EU institution that took the issue of the electoral reform and 
started a debate on it after the 2009 elections. Normally, as argued by Princen with reference to 
the second pathway for governmental agenda-setting, it is the Commission that takes the 
initiative in picking up the policy issues, having regard to the development of an existing 
transnational debate and to the chances of pushing it through the decision-making process. In 
the case of electoral reform, instead, the role of the Commission is structurally marginal, given 
the reinforcement of the Parliament’s right of initiative through the different Treaty revisions. 
During the debate on the Duff report, the Commission declared itself on many occasions44 to be 
out of the picture, adopting what could be defined as an attitude of positive inertia. On the 
contrary, it was the Parliament that was the decisive “venue” for the promotion of the issue, with 
                                                          
43 According to W. Beauvallet et al., op. cit., p. 81, the Members of the AFCO committee tend to have statistically high 
level of education, previous political experience in national governments or Parliaments and, finally, important roles in 
the European Parliament (vice-presidents of the Parliament, group presidents or vice-presidents, former committee 
chairs or vice-chairs). 
44
 The lack of formal role of the Commission was recalled by the then Commissioner Maria Damanaki during the 
debate in the plenary on the first Duff report (European Parliament, Debates of the European Parliament, Thursday 7 
July 2011, Strasbourg, pp. 15-16). 
31 
 
leading MEPs convinced of the necessity to come up with proposals to implement the Treaty 
provisions in an ambitious manner. Needless to say, the impact of this element on the realism of 
the supporters of the proposal will be object of study in the following paragraphs. For the 
moment, it is just worth underlining the paradox of the AFCO committee: one of the most 
prestigious committees of the Parliament, it compensates the lack of legislative powers with the 
great institutional capital deriving from the status of their members, characterised by their 
specialized expertise and longevity in their European political engagement. This institutional 
capital led the MEPs from the AFCO committee to be the true leaders of the Parliament at the 
time of Treaty revisions, for example under the chairmanship of Giorgio Napolitano in 1999-
2004.45 However, the same composition of the committee puts into question its 
representativeness of the broader assembly, potentially creating a gap between the interests of 
its members and that of the average MEP of the same groups. 
 
5. From the committee to the plenary: what went wrong? 
After having been deeply discussed in the AFCO committee by leading figures of the Parliament, 
the Duff report was later bogged down due to the diffidence, if not open hostility, of consistent 
parts of the main political groups. These joined the already opposed Eurosceptic and Europhobic 
groups in blocking the proposal, splitting the main groups and making the existence of a majority 
to pass it more than uncertain. Therefore, the debate on the report was first postponed (first 
months of 2011), then referred back to the committee in July 2011. In spring 2012, the report was 
finally frozen, notwithstanding the reformulation of the AFCO committee, by the Conference of 
Presidents. In order to understand the reason of this blockade, in the previous paragraphs four 
“macro-categories” of potential hurdles to electoral reform in the European Union have been 
                                                          
45 W. Beauvallet et al., op. cit., p. 78. 
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listed. In the present paragraph, they will be tested against the actual debate in the Parliament, 
using interviews and official sources. 
Following the first hurdle, it was hypothesised that the weight of procedural barriers plays, 
even more than at national level, an important role in hampering electoral reform. Given the 
difficult path that led to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, and in light of the deterioration of the 
support towards European integration after the crisis, it can be expected that a tendency now 
exists for the MEPs to abstain from engaging in electoral reform. Surprisingly, when one analyses 
the path of the Duff report from the AFCO committee to the plenary, the role of the procedural 
barrier appears to have played a much less relevant role than expected. Of course, in the 
Parliament as a whole “there was no appetite for Treaty change”.46 During the debate that took 
place in the plenary session of July 2011, more than one critical intervention underlined the 
difficulty to restart a process for Treaty revision, and even MEPs openly supporting the Duff 
proposal showed no enthusiasm for an enterprise so complicated to achieve.47 Nonetheless, the 
procedural hurdle is much less emphasised than expected by the interviewees. In the end, in fact, 
the lack of agreement on the proposal within the Parliament made the perspective of negotiations 
with other institutions a more remote factor.  
In addition, other parts of the Duff report did not suffer the same destiny of the pan-
European constituency. Conversely, they found a majoritarian support in the assembly, and met 
the favour of the governments. It is the case of those provisions that concerned the shifting of 
the period of the elections from June to May, in order to increase the electoral turnout and allow 
                                                          
46 Interview with Sietse Wijnsma, Policy advisor in the AFCO committee (ALDE group), Brussels, 24 March 2015. The 
interviewee recalls how in some cases Treaty reform was not even sufficient, given that – for instance – the 
introduction of a common age for voting at European elections would have required a constitutional revision in many 
Member States. 
47 European Parliament, Debates of the European Parliament, Thursday 7 July 2011, Strasbourg, pp. 17-18, intervention of 
MEP Alexandra Thein on behalf of the ALDE group; and p. 30, intervention of MEP Matthias Groote. 
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the new Commission to take office before November 2014.48 Other provisions foresaw the 
revision of directive 93/109/EC on the right to vote and stand as a candidate in the elections for 
the European Parliament: they were finally, if only partially, endorsed by the Council in the 
following months.49 At the same time, the seat reapportionment needed to adjust the 
Parliament’s size before the end of the temporary derogation to article 14.2 TEU was eventually 
undertaken and successfully endorsed by the Parliament, notwithstanding the fact that, by 
reason of the unanimity needed in the European Council, the matter can be partially compared to 
a Treaty revision (from which it is still different because of the lack of national ratification). This 
led, first, to the adoption by the assembly of the Gualtieri-Trzaskowski report on the composition 
of the European Parliament for 2014-2019,50 and then to the approval of the new distribution of 
seats by the European Council.51 The adoption of the above-mentioned decisions exemplifies the 
fact that the problem was not, in the end, the complex nature of the procedure to follow, but the 
political will of decision-makers on the pan-European constituency (and on the mathematical 
formula for an “automatic” seat reapportionment). In fact, the anticipation of the elections, the 
approval of modifications to directive 93/109/EC on the right to vote and stand for the Parliament 
and, finally, the new allocation of seats among Member States all followed a special legislative 
                                                          
48 An election in May would have allowed anticipating the vote on the President in the July constituent session of the 
Parliament. Previously included in the Duff report, the measure was incorporated by the Casini report adopted in May 
2013: European Parliament, Legislative resolution of 21 May 2013 on the draft Council decision fixing the period for the eight 
election of representatives to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, P7_TA(2013)0194, Strasbourg, 21 May 
2013. Accordingly, the Council brought the election date from 5-8 June to 22-25 May. 
49 Council of the European Union, “Council Directive 2013/1/EU of 20 December 2012 amending Directive 93/109/EC as 
regards certain detailed arrangements for the exercise of the right to stand as a candidate in elections to the European 
Parliament for citizens of the Union residing in a Member State of which they are not nationals”, Official Journal of the 
European Union, n. L 26, 26 January 2013, pp. 27-29. 
50 European Parliament, Resolution of 13 March 2013 on the composition of the European Parliament with a view to the 2014 
elections, op. cit. 
51 European Council, “European Council Decision of 28 June 2013 establishing the composition of the European 
Parliament”, Official Journal of the European Union, n. L 181, 29 June 2013, pp. 57-58. The decision conserved the 
allocation of seats proposed by the Parliament in its resolution of 13 March 2013. 
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procedure, in each case requiring unanimity among Member States.52 This appears to complicate 
further the picture of agenda-setting in the electoral domain, because different dynamics come to 
light when policy-makers, and specifically MEPs, deal with different aspects of electoral reform. 
On the one hand, electoral reform tends to be less controversial when implementing decisions 
already taken in the Treaties, while at the same time avoiding changing the existing equilibrium 
between relevant actors (political parties, Member States, institutions) in a way that is too much 
radical. Accordingly, a new allocation of the Parliament’s seats among Member States can be 
achieved if it does not change in a structural manner the way seats are attributed to them (for 
instance, introducing a non-political mechanism). On the other hand, an ambitious reform like the 
introduction of a pan-European constituency is more difficult to put on the agenda, because of 
the controversy of political nature that is raised among MEPs before the issue can reach the 
stage of interinstitutional negotiations. Consequently, even though the procedural barrier was 
relevant in making agenda-setting of the Union more difficult, it was not, in the case of the Duff 
report, the decisive factor. 
The second of the hurdles considered is linked to the nature of the EU as a consociational 
political system, in which territorial and political minorities are over-represented (cultural-political 
barrier). Following our hypotheses, agenda-setting should be more difficult for proposals aimed 
at breaking the existing balance between the components of the system. For instance, this would 
be the case of proposals which cause a decrease of representative power of territorial minorities 
(medium/smaller Member States) in order to reduce the gap in the ratio seat/voters inside the 
Parliament. From this point of view, two parts of the proposal appear to be relevant: the seat 
                                                          
52 In the case of the Council decision to anticipate elections, it was taken on the basis of article 11 of the 1976 electoral 
Act, which requires unanimity in the Council after consultation of the Parliament. Likewise, the modifications to the 
1993 directive on the right to vote and stand in the elections for the European Parliament were adopted, according to 
article 22.2 TFEU, by unanimity in the Council after consultation of the Parliament. Finally, the adoption of a new seat 
allocation for the Parliament (not a proper legislative act) required unanimity in the European Council, on the initiative 
and with the approval of the Parliament itself (article 14.2, second subparagraph TEU). 
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reapportionment mechanism and the pan-European constituency. Concerning the first, it can be 
excluded that the allocation of seats played a decisive role. It is certainly true that the 
mathematical formula envisaged by the rapporteur as the objective of negotiations, which would 
allow for a seat-reapportionment the fourth year of each Parliament without the usual inter-state 
negotiations, was an element of debate among national delegations. In particular, MEPs from 
bigger Member States like France or Spain were eager to see a more proportional mechanism for 
seat allocation,53 and MEPs from Germany underlined in the plenary debate how urgent was to 
reform the apportionment in the light of the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional 
Tribunal.54 Nevertheless, first, the Duff report stated that the Parliament proposed “to enter in a 
dialogue with the European Council to explore the possibility of reaching agreement on a durable 
and transparent mathematical formula for the apportionment of seats”. In other words, the 
mathematical formula was considered as one of the possible outcomes of a negotiation with the 
Member States, without assuming a strong position on a defined model since the beginning. 
Second, the last version of the Duff report (2012) eliminated the reference to the mathematical 
formula, making the ultimate goal of a sustainable and less political reapportionment mechanism 
much more generic in its formulation. 
Concerning the pan-European constituency, one could pinpoint various elements that put 
it at the centre on the debate, both in the plenary and in the informal discussions inside political 
groups. The picture of the path of the Duff report from the AFCO committee to the plenary, in fact, 
appears to be significantly marked by the issue of the potential consequences of the 
establishment of a single district on the representation of smaller Member States. Three sub-
                                                          
53 Interview with Andrew Duff, MEP (ALDE) until 2014, Brussels, 17 March 2015. 
54 See European Parliament, Debates of the European Parliament, Thursday 7 July 2011, Strasbourg, p. 31, intervention of 
MEP Rainer Wieland - EPP. 
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issues can be identified that had, or were supposed to have, an important impact on the 
representation of MEPs coming from smaller Member States in the Parliament: 
1) First, the election of the twenty-five “federal” MEPs on the basis of transnational lists, 
which was considered by MEPs from small Member States as strengthening the 
representation of bigger countries. This idea was based on the assumption that 
delegations coming from the biggest Member States, as the most powerful national 
delegations in the European political parties, would influence substantially the 
composition of the pan-European lists, given that the majority of voters are residents in 
their home countries; 
2) Second, the additional nature of the twenty-five MEPs elected on the pan-European lists, 
which implied that candidates elected in these lists were added to, instead of drawn from, 
the total of 751 MEP. This offered, according to the medium-sized and smaller Member 
State, another evidence of the concealed reinforcement of the bigger countries’ 
representation; 
3) Third, the nature of the transnational lists, that were originally semi-open and that ended 
up following a closed system just as a compromise to guarantee these countries.55 The 
possibility, for the voter, to change the order of candidates in the list through preferential 
voting would have favoured the candidates coming from the bigger Member States, 
supposed to receive more preferences from their home countries. 
If one lists Member States according to the seats allocated for the 2014 elections, three 
groups of countries can be identified: a group of “big” countries (from 50 to 96 seats), another of 
medium countries (from 20 to 49) and a last group of small countries (from 6 to 19). Following 
this categorisation, it is immediately evident that MEPs coming from medium and small Member 
                                                          
55 Interview with Sietse Wijnsma, Policy advisor in the AFCO committee (ALDE group), Brussels, 24 March 2015. 
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States who took the floor in the plenary of 7 July 2011 were largely opposed to the proposal. In 
particular, 6 out of 9 MEPs taking the floor and coming from medium-sized Member States 
declared their opposition, notwithstanding the political group they belonged to. Similarly, 7 out of 
10 MEPs coming from small Member States and speaking during the plenary on the issue argued 
against the proposal. In this respect, no distinction can be made between more integrationist and 
more Eurosceptical groups, with MEPs coming from all the “mainstream” groups split on the 
issue. In all cases, the argument put forward by opposed MEPs was the (supposed) risk of 
reducing the role of MEPs coming from the medium and small countries, traditionally over-
represented in the composition of the European Parliament. Actually, it is precisely to overcome 
this blockade that the compromise proposal of drawing the twenty-five MEPs from nationally-
elected candidates was advanced, and openly defended by more federalist MEPs during the 
plenary debate.56 Accordingly, in the second report, no mention was included to the additional 
nature of the pan-European MEPs, assuming that they were no more elected on top of the 
existing 751. This, combined with the system of closed lists, should have guaranteed the 
medium-sized and smaller countries about the balanced nature of transnational party lists, 
because the order of preference would have been no more determined by the electorate of 
biggest countries.57 Nonetheless, the fact that the opposition on the pan-European constituency 
persisted until its freezing in the Conference of Presidents in 2012 shows how the issue of the 
representation of medium-sized and small Member States played a crucial role in the Parliament. 
It contributed decisively in preventing the assembly from approving the report and starting a 
dialogue with Member States with a united position. This ultimately demonstrates how, 
notwithstanding the letter of the Treaties, many MEPs still think and carry out their tasks as they 
                                                          
56 Not by chance, a MEP coming from a small Member State, Austrian Green MEP Ulrike Lunacek (European Parliament, 
Debates of the European Parliament, Thursday 7 July 2011, Strasbourg, pp. 32-33). 
57 Of course, the link established by smaller Member States between the creation of a transnational list and the weight 
of the electorates of bigger Member States is far from being evident. On the contrary, one could argue – following the 
rapporteur’s logic – that the choice of candidates goes well beyond their nationalities, given that the vote on the 
transnational lists would favour, in principle, those personalities who are well known and appreciated across the EU. 
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represented the citizens of their home countries and not the European citizens as a whole. This 
appears to be particularly true in the case of electoral reform, as we expected in our hypotheses. 
The above-mentioned considerations make it possible to understand why, in the case of 
the Duff proposal, the need to fix system-level inconsistencies of the electoral system played a 
minor, if not inexistent role in the opposition to it. The systemic hurdle to electoral reform 
concerns, as showed above, the gap between the actual functioning of the electoral system and 
its expected output, and the way this plays a role in making the policy-maker receptive to reform 
initiative. It is widely recognized how, during all the period going from the first direct elections to 
the introduction of common principles by the 2002 reform, the problem of distortions in the 
system was at the heart of the clash between the Parliament and the Council. Conversely, today, 
distortions appear not to be useful for understanding the dynamics of electoral reform at EU level, 
even after the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty. In fact, it was underlined before how 
the distortions that affect the present system (national-based, with partial harmonization) do not 
concern any more huge divergence between national legislations, but the same existence of 
national separate systems, which can brought about inconsistencies in the accounting of the 
popular vote.58 To cope with this issue, it would be needed even more than a pan-European 
district, but an authentic uniform procedure, which would remove obstacles to a translation of 
votes into seats on a common federal ground. In addition, distortions must be assessed against 
the expected output of the policy-maker. This is the most crucial factor to take into account, 
because, when analysing agenda-setting in the field of electoral reform, it is this relationship 
between expected output and actual results that matters more. From this standpoint, as argued 
above, it is far from evident that MEPs feel the urgent need to further the uniformization of 
                                                          
58 It is the case of the gap, in the 2014 elections for the European Parliament, between votes for the European parties in 
absolute terms and balance between the groups in the Parliament. It must be noted that, to a bigger or smaller degree, 
this kind of distortions are present in most electoral systems. 
39 
 
electoral processes at European level, given that all the main groups split on the possibility of 
introducing a much less ambitious supranational constituency. Both the observation of the 
position taken formally in the debate inside the Parliament and the interviews with relevant 
actors do not show any attention for this point, except for the rapporteur’s declared purpose of 
overcoming the current national character of European elections. 
Concerning the fourth and last hurdle, it was hypothesised that a natural resistance 
towards electoral reform exists, because the incumbent policy-makers (in this case, MEPs) are 
elected thanks to the present rules. In addition, it was expected that different interests among 
political actors can potentially lead to a barrage of opposition on different parties of a reform 
proposal. Both the analysis of official documents and of informal negotiations in the Parliament 
reveal the important role played by vested interests existing in the Parliament in blocking the 
proposal at an early stage. Since the beginning of the discussion in the AFCO committee, it 
became clear that different approaches existed not so much between political groups, as 
between national delegations inside them. This led to the elimination, in the first report approved 
by the committee, of the original proposal to set up regional constituencies for European 
elections.59 Once the report adopted, the discussion between the shadow rapporteurs of the 
groups revealed quite soon that it was not clear if the respective groups would have been united 
on it.60 When confronted with the first Duff report adopted by the AFCO committee, different 
national delegations put forwards divergent priorities, splitting the groups to the extent that it 
was not possible to understand if a majority existed in the Parliament. As observed above, a first 
line of division separated MEPs coming from bigger Member States, which were favoured by the 
                                                          
59 The aim of the supporters of this proposal was to bring the MEPs closer to the electors, while contributing to 
overcome the “national” character of the election. However, delegations from Member States, and among them the 
Spanish, Hungarian and Romanian ones, feared that this kind of “regionalization” of the European elections could have 
strengthened the political weight of linguistic or ethnic minorities living within their territory, boosting regional 
separatism (interview with Sietse Wijnsma, Policy advisor in the AFCO committee (ALDE group), Brussels, 24 March 
2015). 
60 Ibid. 
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proposal to go towards a more proportional allocation of seats, and those who came from 
medium-sized and small Member States, who feared the consequences of the transnational list 
on their representation. Consequently, the German, French, Italian and Spanish delegation were, 
in principle, in favour of the report, given their potential gain in terms of new seats in the 
Parliament. Delegations like the Irish, Maltese or Baltic ones were, instead, resolutely against, 
especially with regard to the pan-European district and the possibility of a transnational party 
list.61 All the main groups were split on the issue of the twenty-five MEPs to be elected on 
transnational lists. This situation allows to understand why, according to one of the interviewees, 
the small delegations were the actors to be blamed for the failure of the Parliament to take a 
position on electoral reform.62 However, the cleavages inside the groups were more complicated 
by the ambiguous attitude assumed by some individual MEPs, attitude that cannot be justified in 
terms of the opposition big/small national delegations. First, the British MEPs, with the notable 
exception of the Liberal-Democrats of the rapporteur, were all against the report, notwithstanding 
the advantage for their country in terms of potential seats. The French delegation, for its part, 
saw its members in the S&D group backing the proposal, while more scepticism emerged in the 
EPP group, with many UMP63 MEPs fearing the transnational list as a vehicle of Europeanization 
of French electoral campaigns.64 In the German camp, the leading supporter of the report, Elmar 
Brok, found it difficult to defend the proposal after it was clear that no threshold in the pan-
European list would have been included.65 In fact, a huge discussion took place in the German 
delegation after the ruling of the Bundesverfassungsgericht of 26 February 2014, which declared 
                                                          
61 “They perceived that list as undermining their chances to reach more seats and, therefore, they rejected any 
possibility to move forward with the reform of the electoral law” (interview with Enrique Guerrero Salom, MEP and S&D 
group coordinator in the AFCO committee during 7th legislature, Brussels, 19 March 2015). 
62 Ibid. 
63 Union pour un Mouvement Populaire. 
64 Later, in the plenary debate on the first Duff report, it is remarkable that only French MEPs coming from the UMP 
took the floor, and that all of them expressed a hostile stance on the issue of the pan-European constituency: it is the 
case of Sophie Auconie and of Jean-Pierre Audy (European Parliament, Debates of the European Parliament, Thursday 7 
July 2011, Strasbourg, pp. 30-31 and pp. 33-34). 
65 Interview with Andrew Duff, MEP (ALDE) until 2014, Brussels, 17 March 2015. 
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unconstitutional the threshold of 3% of votes established for European elections in their 
country.66 According to the rapporteur, Polish MEPs were also quite sceptical; MEPs of the 
centre-right Civic Platform, in particular, were in majority against the report. Following former 
MEP Duff’s opinion, they were generally scared by the euroscepticism still widespread in their 
home country.67 
One could maintain that the plenary consolidated conflicts among national delegations, 
instead of solving them. When finally the report came to plenary for a first debate, on 7 July 2011, 
the persisting divisions inside the groups became more evident, a sign that MEPs representing 
political parties in the AFCO committee had not managed to find a compromise for a broad 
agreement. It is true that, if one analyses the position of different national delegations during the 
plenary debate, some “outlier” positions are taken by individual MEPs.68 Nevertheless, overall, the 
divide between smaller and bigger Member States persisted, appearing to be one of the main 
dividing issues raised during the debate in the plenary (the other one being the controversy 
between main groups and Eurosceptic groups on the legitimacy of representation at the EU 
level).69 In addition, following the opinion of one interviewee, the complexity of some parts of the 
report – in particular, the mathematical formula foreseen as the ultimate objective of a new 
negotiation with Member States over seat reapportionment – contributed to reinforce opposition 
both in bigger and smaller delegations70. Accordingly, the rapporteur asked for the referral back 
                                                          
66 “Germany’s top court annuls 3% threshold for EU election”, EurActive Germany, 27 February 2014, retrieved 19 April 
2015 at http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-elections-2014/germanys-top-court-annuls-3-threshold-eu-election-
300927. 
67 Interview with Andrew Duff, MEP (ALDE) until 2014, Brussels, 17 March 2015. 
68 For example, it is interesting to note that one MEP from a Baltic country, Lithuanian S&D MEP Zigmantas Balčytis, 
argued in favour of the proposal, aligning with the arguments put forward by the rapporteur (European Parliament, 
Debates of the European Parliament, Thursday 7 July 2011, Strasbourg, p. 29, intervention of Zigmantas Balčytis – S&D). 
To make another example, Liberal MEP from Sweden Olle Schmidt was quite active in the debate deconstructing the 
argument of Eurosceptic groups and even attacking small Member States for a lack of confidence in the ability of their 
MEPs to become influent at European level (ibid, p. 28, intervention of Olle Schmidt – ALDE). 
69 This second issue is given less relevance in the present work because of its relatively marginal role in shaping the 
path of the report in the Parliament. 
70
 Interview with Sietse Wijnsma, Policy advisor in the AFCO committee (ALDE group), Brussels, 24 March 2015. 
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to the committee in order to engage in another round of negotiations among groups and national 
delegations, hoping to found a compromise on the more critical points. However, even the 
compromise reached in the AFCO committee on a second report was not enough to secure a 
majority in the Parliament. Here it is worth recalling that the second Duff proposal of 2012 
eliminated any reference to the “mathematical formula” for reapportionment, and changed 
significant provisions related to the pan-European constituency. While the number of MEPs 
elected in the single district was not changed (and, in any case, it was considered by the same 
rapporteur as arbitrary),71 the closed list system replaced the semi-preferential voting of the first 
report, and the additional nature of the pan-European MEPs was not mentioned any more. 
However, even after the “cleaning up” of the proposal, the diffidence of smaller delegations was 
still spread enough to make an approval quite unlikely. As stated above, the debate on the 
proposal was blocked after the approval of the second report by the AFCO committee, through a 
decision of the Conference of Presidents not to put it on the agenda of the plenary. 
Comparing these findings with our hypotheses: 
 We expected the typical reluctance of legislators to result in a timid approach among 
MEPs, especially given the complex nature of the proposal and the consequent difficulty 
in the calculation of net benefits actors can obtain from its approval. This appears to be 
confirmed by the above-mentioned data, given the gap between the broad endorsement of 
the report by the AFCO committee and the harsh reception it was given inside every group. 
The latter appear to derive from diverging interests among national delegations with 
reference to seat maximizing; 
                                                          
71 Ibid. According to Wijnsma, MEP Duff choose the number of twenty-five MEPs in order to fit in the average A4 ballot 
box. In addition, he underlined how the number of twenty-five was also conceived to avoid “one Member State – one 
candidate” lists (considering that EU included 27 countries at that time: “at least, it was clear that not every country 
would have had one seat”). 
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 We expected political groups to avoid confrontational behaviour between national 
delegations and not to invest political capital on a vote in which an evident division inside 
them risks to emerge. Accordingly, the main groups, whose leading figures in the 
Parliament had assumed a favourable stance towards the report in the committee debate, 
preferred to postpone indefinitely the vote on the proposal, to avoid the risk of a rejection 
by a cross-group majority in the plenary; 
 We expected the existence of different coalitions over content to split the groups and 
avoid that a package deal was ultimately struck to pass the report and open negotiations 
with Member States. This is precisely what happened in the path of the Duff report from 
the committee to the plenary, with different priorities emerging both along the line 
bigger/smaller Member States, and along specific matters (like the introduction of a 
common threshold for the single European district). It is possible to argue that the 
cumulated effect of these different oppositions resulted in the zero-option (no reform) 
being finally privileged by the majority of MEPs. 
It can thus be argued that a combination of the above-mentioned factors resulted in a 
stalemate in the debate over the proposal, with the opening of a dialogue on electoral reform with 
Member States not being endorsed by the Parliament. As a result, further developments in 
electoral rules towards a federalization of the elections of the Parliament were left off the agenda 
of the Union, and even of the Parliament. To quote one of the interviewees, when dealing with 
electoral reform “the main cause of opposition itself is self-interest. Because if you are going to 
change the way MEPs are elected, you are touching upon the basis of their existence, of their 
legitimacy. So that [the Duff proposal] got them really afraid”.72 
 
                                                          
72 Ibid. 
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Conclusion 
The path followed by the Duff report between 2009 and 2012 appears to be particularly 
illustrative of the dynamics that develop in the Parliament when MEPs are confronted with 
electoral reform. From this standpoint, the model built by Princen to analyse agenda-setting in 
the EU has been profitably used to examine the different steps of the report in the Parliament. It 
was observed how the absence of a true “cross-Member States” network was more than 
compensated by the traditional role played in the AFCO committee by a narrow “authority group” 
dealing with electoral reform. As in past attempts undertaken by the Parliament to put electoral 
reform on the Union’s agenda, it was the existence of a group of federalist-minded MEPs of the 
AFCO committee that was decisive in raising the issue, taking advantage of their relevant 
institutional capital. Moreover, it was argued that this cross-group network managed to put the 
issue on the agenda of the Parliament making use of the need to implement existing provisions. 
This explains the easiness to influence what the literature on agenda-setting defines 
“governmental agenda”, when no concrete decision is still at stake on the policy issue. However, 
when dealing with the inability of the Parliament to endorse the report and open a dialogue with 
Member States, a different type of mechanism comes into play. Using the barriers approach of 
Rahat and Hazan, the “freezing” of the Duff proposal in the path from the committee to the 
plenary was explained with the instruments of non-agenda setting in the field of electoral reform. 
Fours macro-barriers were identified to understand why the proposal was finally not taken up in 
the “decision agenda”, which would have implied the approval of the report and the start of 
negotiations with Member States. Contrary to expectations, the procedural barrier played a minor 
role than foreseen. Even if often quoted by the relevant actors as one of the factors that 
determined the opposition to the proposal, the controversy on the issue was more political, as 
demonstrated by the approval of many “minor” elements of the Duff report in the months 
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following. The opposition by MEPs coming from medium-sized and smaller Member States, 
which feared that a pan-European constituency could turn to benefit the countries where the 
majority of electors live, represented one of the most important barriers. This allows comparing 
the nature of parliamentary representation at the Union level to that existing in consociational 
democracies, in which the over-representation of minorities is often permitted in order to 
integrate them in the decision-making process. In addition, the minor role played by distortions 
stemming from the coexistence of separate electoral systems took away one of the factors that 
had led the Parliament, during the 1990s, to ask for the revision of the existing rules, in order to 
ensure their proper functioning. This confirms that, for many MEPs, the representative function is 
still accomplished with reference to the citizens of their home countries, and that there is no 
consensus for a Europeanization of national campaigns. Finally, the fourth barrier was decisive 
as well: vested interests of national delegations, complexity in determining the net benefit 
deriving to them from the eventual introduction of the single district, disagreement over different 
parts of the proposal were all elements that contributed decisively in the failure of the proposal. 
These results show not only the gap existing between the policy-orientation in the 
committee and in the plenary (which, in itself, it is not particularly surprising),73 but the nature of 
the dynamics underlying electoral reform in the European Parliament. In fact, the relevance of the 
second and fourth macro-barriers seems to underline the centrality of national delegations in the 
process leading to the blockage of the proposal. From this point of view, the study of agenda-
setting in the field of electoral reform has the potential to enrich the existing literature on MEPs’ 
voting behaviour. Following a seminal work of Hix, Noury and Roland, “supranational party 
                                                          
73 The possibility of “splits in group cohesion in cases where the preferences of committee members are very different 
from those of the median members of the party groups” is analysed in T. Raunio, Party Group Behaviour in the European 
Parliament. An Analysis of Transnational Political Groups in the 1989-94 Parliament, Acta Universitatis Tamperensis, ser. A, 
vol. 521, Tampere, 1996, p. 112. 
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politics is a key aspect of policy-making in the emerging European polity”74. Through the 
examination of 15,000 roll-call votes between 1979 and 2004, the authors argued that a tendency 
towards an increase in group cohesion exists in the Parliament, and that “voting along 
supranational lines gradually replaced voting along national party lines as the dominant form of 
behaviour in the Parliament”.75 Notwithstanding the lack of resources to exert significant 
pressure on MEPs,76 the political groups offer the opportunity to coordinate action among MEPs 
sharing similar ideology and to influence policy outcomes.77 In addition, following their reasoning, 
a link is established between the cohesion of political groups and the increase in inter-group 
conflict along the left-right divide, so that “the political groups are able to maintain internal 
cohesion precisely because inter-party competition and coalition behaviour is driven by partisan 
policy preferences”.78 Conversely, the case of the Duff proposal for electoral reform appears to 
demonstrate that, when constitutional issues emerge, different cleavages determine the voting 
behaviour of MEPs, splitting the groups alongside national lines. Further research is needed to 
confirm this inference. However, the results do not seem surprising: the electoral domain, even 
more than other “constitutional” policy areas, does not concern policy competences or 
interinstitutional balances, but the representation of citizens and the link between candidates and 
voters. It follows that the splitting of the political groups alongside diverging national priorities 
and the preference of the incumbent for the status quo make agenda-setting in the electoral 
domain particularly difficult to achieve, even more than the average constitutional issue. 
                                                          
74 S. Hix, A. G. Noury & G. Roland, Democratic politics in the European Parliament, Cambridge, Cambridge University press, 
2007, p. 3. 
75 Ibid. However, the representativeness of the study is questioned by D. Judge, & D. Earnshaw, The European Parliament, 
2nd ed., Houndmills, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 143-145. The authors point at the small amount of 
votes in the Parliament that are held through roll-call voting, and at their strategic use by the groups. 
76 Due to the exclusive competence of national parties over candidatures and the lack of “executive discipline” deriving 
from an integrated government-majority relationship (ibid., p. 5). 
77 See also R. Corbett, F. Jacobs & M. Shackleton, The European Parliament, 8th ed., London, John Harper Publishing, 
2011, p. 122. 
78 Hix, Noury & Roland, op. cit., p. 159. 
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The above-mentioned considerations explain why, unlike the case of previous attempts to 
electoral reform carried out since the 1979, the Duff proposal did not result in the Parliament 
approving a report, on the basis of which exerting pressure on Member States. This lets to 
highlight the substantial peculiarity of agenda-setting on electoral reform in the present times. 
While in the decades 1979-2002 the main barrier to electoral reform was the Council, with some 
Member States blocking any proposal to uniform electoral procedures, in the case of the Duff 
report the main opposition was inside the Parliament. This resulted in the blockage of the 
proposal at an earlier stage, questioning the ability of the Parliament itself in pushing for a 
stronger parliamentary representation at European level and, ultimately, for a more federal Union. 
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Europe is in a constant state of flux. European politics, economics, law and indeed 
European societies are changing rapidly. The European Union itself is in a continuous situation of 
adaptation. New challenges and new requirements arise continually, both internally and 
externally.  
The College of Europe Studies series seeks to publish research on these issues done at the 
College of Europe, both at its Bruges and its Natolin (Warsaw) campus. Focused on the European 
Union and the European integration process, this research may be specialised in the areas of 
political science, law or economics, but much of it is of an interdisciplinary nature. The objective 
is to promote understanding of the issues concerned and to make a contribution to ongoing 
discussions. 
L’Europe subit des mutations permanentes. La vie politique, l’économie, le droit, mais 
également les sociétés européennes, changent rapidement. L’Union européenne s’inscrit dès lors 
dans un processus d’adaptation constant. Des défis et des nouvelles demandes surviennent sans 
cesse, provenant à la fois de l’intérieur et de l’extérieur. 
La collection des Cahiers du Collège d’Europe publie les résultats des recherches menées 
sur ces thèmes au Collège d’Europe, au sein de ses deux campus (Bruges et Varsovie). Focalisés 
sur l’Union européenne et le processus d’intégration, ces travaux peuvent être spécialisés dans 
les domaines des sciences politiques, du droit ou de l’économie, mais ils sont le plus souvent de 
nature interdisciplinaire. La collection vise à approfondir la compréhension de ces questions 
complexes et contribue ainsi au débat européen. 
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